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Aut catechismus, aut materialismus ist ihre Losung.[...]. 
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chismus einerseits und der Tiegel und Retorten oder der 
Affenregister, andererseits, dem Publiko etwas vor.
(A. Schopenhauer, Über den Willen in der Natur)
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A bstrac t. In  its essence, the explanatory po ten tia l o f  the theory o f  natural 
selection is based on the iterative process o f  random production and  varia­
tion, a n d  subsequent non-random , d irective selection. I t  is shown th a t 
within this explanatory framework, there is no place fo r  the explanation o f  
sexual reproduction. Thus in Darwinistic literature, sexual reproduction — 
one o f  nature’s most salient characteristics — is often either assumed or ig­
nored, bu t not explained. This fundam en ta l and  challenging gap w ithin a 
complete naturalistic understanding o f  living beings calls fo r  the need o f  a 
cybernetic account for sexual reproduction, meaning an understanding o f  the 
dynamic and  creative potential o f  living beings to continuously and autono­
mously produce new organisms w ith unique and  specific constellations.
1. SU RV IV AL A N D  R E P R O D U C T IO N  AS E X P L A N A N S
T he theory o f evolution by natural selection is based on certain 
premises about the natural world, which can be seen as conditions 
that, if  fulfilled, autom atically and necessarily lead to the process 
o f evolution (see for example Ridley [1993], and M ayr [1991]). 
These conditions include the existence of heritable variation w ithin 
a p o p u la tio n  causing d ifferen tia l reproductive success, and the 
struggle for survival am ong living beings. As Ridley puts it, if all 
conditions are m et for any property o f a species, natural selection 
autom atically  results. M ayr, essentially conveying the same mes­
sage, prefers to  speak abou t facts and  inferences: the  fact th a t 
populations poten tia lly  exponentially  increase, and the fact th a t 
there is an observed steady-state stability of populations, combined 
with a lim itation on resources, lead to the inference that there is a 
struggle for existence am ong individuals. M oreover, the fact tha t 
each individual is unique, and tha t m uch of the individual varia­
tion  is heritable, necessarily leads to differential survival, i.e. natu ­
ral selection, which subsequently leads to evolution (Mayr [1991]). 
D arw in him self said it in the following way:
O w ing to this struggle for life, any variation, however slight and 
from  w hatever cause proceeding, if  it be in any degree profitable 
to an individual o f any species, in its infinitely com plex relations 
to  o th e r o rganic  beings and  to external beings and to external 
nature, will tend  to the preservation o f tha t individual, and will 
generally be inherited  by its offspring. T he offspring, also, will
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thus have a better chance of surviving, for, of the m any individu­
als o f any species which are periodically born, bu t a small num ber 
can survive. I have called this principle, by which each slight vari­
ation, if useful, is preserved, by the term  N atura l Selection (D ar­
win [1968], p. 115).
Some of these facts or premises were hardly understood in D ar­
w in’s time. For example, neither the heredity of characteristics nor 
the  source o f variations found  a sound scientific understand ing  
until after the genetic revolution w ithin biology. Even today, how­
ever, no t all premises are sufficiently explained. T he struggle for 
survival, one o f the elem entary assumptions of the theory o f natu ­
ral selection, rests on the following pillars: (1) there is a tendency 
o f organic beings to strive to increase their num bers to the maxi­
m um  (M ayr’s potential exponential increase o f populations), and
(2) lim ited  resources cannot possibly support all offspring; ergo, 
there is a struggle for survival among organic beings. W hat is thus 
assumed in the Darwinian argum ent is the fact that organic beings 
strive to increase their num bers to the m axim um , in other words, 
the existence o f living beings w ith their striving for survival and 
reproduction. D arw in set ou t to explain the m odifications o f liv­
ing beings — the transition from one life form to another — through 
the origin and dynamics o f adaptations (traits that have evolved as 
a direct result o f natural selection): how they arise, spread through 
the population, lead to divergence am ong populations, and even­
tually give rise to the origin o f new species. So the explanandum  in 
the theory o f natural selection is evolution, the mechanism behind 
the origin o f adaptations, as well as the general fact o f adaptation, 
but not living beings w ith their striving towards survival and repro­
duction . M oreover, the  la tte r are presupposed. A dap tations are 
explained, b u t only by presupposing living beings tha t, th rough  
their actions, ensure the survival o f traits. D arw in set ou t to  ex­
plain the adaptation o f organisms, no t organisms themselves. H e 
focused on the differences among organic beings, and assumed first 
o f all the organisms themselves, and, second o f all, w hat is com ­
m on in them , namely their striving towards survival and reproduc­
tion. Thus, in a paradoxical bu t undeniable sense, D arw in’s theory 
o f natural selection can be called vitalistic, because he presupposes 
living beings w ith their striving, and let them  play an elem entary
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role in his explanation o f evolution. H is explanation o f evolution 
and  adaptation  m igh t be m echanical, b u t the  exp lanation  itself 
presupposes a non-m echanistic  concept o f life. D arw in assumes 
the struggle for existence (survival and reproduction) as a fact and 
prerequisite  for natural selection. B ut for D arw in to provide an 
exhaustive explanation for life, he would have to explain the strug­
gle for existence by m eans o f natural selection, and n o t natural 
selection by means of the struggle for existence.
O th er authors have m ade sim ilar claims. Both James Barham  
and Abner Shim ony have stressed tha t the theory o f natural selec­
tion  presupposes certain elem entary characteristic o f living beings. 
In  this sense, so they claim, the theory resembles Boyle’s law: just 
as D arw in presupposes these features instead o f explaining them , 
so too, in his gas theory, Boyle presupposes the  existence o f the 
forces underlying the m atter constitu ting  gasses, and he does not 
attem pt to explain them . Thus, natural selection is a sort o f statis­
tical m echanics o f organisms, where the probability  theory is ap­
plied to biological phenom ena (Barham [2002], Shim ony [1989]). 
A nd one o f these assumptions is, as argued, the striving for survival 
and reproduction o f organisms.
T he use of the w ord ‘fitness’, a central concept within the theory 
o f natural selection, reflects this theory’s nature. A lthough fitness 
is an am biguous term  (Dawkins [1982]), it p redom inantly  refers 
to  the  po ten tia l o f living beings to  survive and  reproduce. T he 
process o f adaptation, then , is the evolutionary m odification o f a 
character under selection for a fitness-enhancing functioning in a 
particular context or set o f contexts (W est-Eberhard [1998]). In 
o ther words, traits, or adaptations, the explanandum  in the theory 
o f natural selection, are explained through their fitness-enhancing 
effects, which thus serve as explanatory ground. T o give an exam­
ple (derived from  the Origin o f  Species): an accidental deviation in 
the  size and  form  o f a body  o f an insect m igh t p ro fit a bee or 
o ther insect, so th a t an individual so characterized w ould be able 
to obtain its food more quickly, and so have a better chance of liv­
ing and leaving descendants (Darw in [1968], p. 141). So, the de­
v iation  in size and form  o f the  bee (explanandum) is explained 
by its fitness-increasing effect (it obtains its food m ore quickly,
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and thus has a be tter chance o f living and leaving descendants). 
Explaining traits, like longer legs, better eyesight or m ore colorful 
flowers, is done through the already-existing living being tha t al­
ready strives to survive and to reproduce: the only effect of an en­
hanced  tra it is th a t the  ind iv idual does th is a b it be tte r, w hich 
consequently results in the spreading o f this tra it th roughou t the 
population (adaptation, evolution).
In  light o f this analysis, it is also im portant to m ark the differ­
ence between the preservation o f  traits and the survival o f  organisms. 
W hereas preservation relates to traits or adaptations, and thus to 
entities that are preserved over the generations and during the course 
o f evolution, survival relates to organisms, and only concerns the 
survival w ithin a lifespan. An organism has no evolutionary conti­
nuity: in the  D arw inian context, an organism  survives if it lives 
long enough to reproduce; destruction is in any case unavoidable 
(the use o f the term  survival in the context of organisms is there­
fore confusing  and  m isleading). T ra its , on the  o ther hand , are 
po ten tia lly  im m ortal, as they can spread trough the population , 
and can endlessly be passed from  generation to generation. M oreo­
ver, traits, or adaptations are explananda; the very th ing  D arw in 
set ou t to explain. T he survival o f organisms, on the o ther hand, 
serves as explanans, one o f the prem ises o f the  theory  o f natural 
selection, one o f the conditions for evolution to take place. These 
two phenom ena — survival o f organisms and preservation o f traits
— are thus obviously d ifferent phenom ena, w ith  different places 
w ith in  the theory  o f na tu ra l selection. In  th is ligh t, it is h ighly 
remarkable that even Darwin did not clearly make this distinction, 
or at least d id  n o t consisten tly  apply the  term inology. In  some 
passages o f the Origin o f  Species, preservation and survival refer to 
m odifications o f qualities (traits), and in o ther passages to ind i­
viduals, or even races. In  some passages we find “th a t individuals 
having any advantage, however slight, over others, would have the 
best chance o f surviving and o f procreating their k in d ” (D arw in 
[1968], pp. 130-131), and “this preservation o f favourable varia­
tions and the rejection o f injurious variations, I call N atural Selec­
t io n ” (D arw in  [1968], p. 131). B ut th en  a little  farther on we 
read:
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I can under such circum stances see no reason to do u b t th a t the 
sw iftest and slim m est wolves w ould have the best chance o f su r­
viving, and  so be preserved or selected [...] (D arw in [1968], p. 
138) — and  — N atu ra l selection can act only by the preservation 
and accum ulation o f infinitesimally small inherited m odifications, 
each p ro fitab le  to the preserved being  [...] (D arw in  [1968], p. 
142).
H ere, D arw in uses the term  preservation for bo th  organisms and 
m odifications, despite their p rofoundly  different role w ith in  the 
theory. Paradoxically enough, we find the m ost unusual subject of 
preservation w ithin the subtitle o f the Origin o f  Species, “the pres­
ervation  o f favoured  races in  the  struggle fo r life”, a reference 
which does not reappear in the work. Still, a close analysis o f the 
theory  o f natural selection forces us to clearly differentiate these 
phenom ena, and allocate them  different roles w ith in  the D arw in­
ian explanatory scheme.
If  we further investigate the possible explanation o f the sexual 
reproducing organism , we see th a t the trad itional D arw inian ex­
p lanation , i.e. the explanation o f traits based on the fitness they 
cause, canno t help us fu rth e r. W e have seen th a t  tra its  are ex­
p lained  th rough  the fitness they  produce. B etter eyesight is se­
lected because it enhances the chance tha t an organism possessing 
it can survive and reproduce. T hus, the  tra it causing better eye­
sight has a h igher p robab ility  to  spread th rough  the  popu lation  
than  the original tra it leading to  less good eyesight, so leading to 
evolution. If  we w anted to fit the question of the existence o f re­
production  w ith in  this explanatory framework, we w ould have to 
talk  abou t the orig in  o f the  tra its th a t cause th is behaviour and 
processes: let us say the genitals, the horm one system, and the rel­
evant parts o f the  brain . I f  we apply the  explanatory  schem e as 
described above, the answer would have to be that these structures 
and organs exist because they increase fitness, the ability to survive 
and reproduce. So the  g round  for the existence o f reproductive 
organs is the possibility o f organisms to reproduce. Now, here we 
are obviously begging the question concerning the origin o f repro­
duction, and it is clear that we cannot explain reproduction in this 
way. I f  we try  to  explain rep roduction  w ith  fitness, we mix the
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explanans w ith the explanandum, and consequently end up w ith a 
petitio principii.
W h en  we consider the  D arw in ian  exp lana to ry  schem e in a 
broader context, we see that it encourages us to see biological phe­
nom ena, no t as the work o f a supernatural creator or the result of 
an im m anen t tendency  in  nature , b u t sim ply as entities th a t by 
chance persist. T he theory of natural selection tells us to see nature 
not as a specific production — the theory adds nothing, and couldn’t 
possibly add anything, to the known (blind and undirected) forces 
o f na tu re  and  com pletely  adheres to  the  natu ra l sciences — b u t 
rather as a specific selection. A nd the entities tha t are selected are 
sim ply those th a t are left over after the  less fit are e lim inated . 
M ayr accordingly described natural selection as a two-step process: 
the  first step is the  p roduction  o f random  variation, the  second 
step is the actual process o f non-random  selection or elim ination 
(M ayr [1988]). This statem ent is correct, b u t still incom plete: by 
just focusing on variation, M ayr presupposes the existence o f liv­
ing beings where this random  variation can occur. A complete ac­
count w ould state tha t natural selection works on entities that by 
chance are p roduced  (origin o f life) and subsequently  m odified 
th ro u g h  random  m u ta tions . T h u s n a tu ra l selection w orks as a 
sieve on entities th a t themselves are created and altered by u nd i­
rected, b lind forces.
In this sense, the Darwinian explanation is well adapted to deal 
w ith the explanation o f traits. T raits find their origin in random  
m utations, where only those variants are preserved th a t increase 
the  fitness o f the ir bearers, and therefore bring  about their own 
preservation. However, this explanation is not well adapted to deal 
w ith sexually reproducing organisms.
T o  illustrate this, le t’s im agine two individual organisms tha t 
compete for food. O ne of them  is able to obtain it because of, say, 
better m uscular developm ent, while the o ther dies o f starvation. 
N ow  it is quite legitim ate to say tha t the stronger organism  is se­
lected, that natural selection favours the stronger animal above the 
o ther one, bu t this in terpretation of selection does not provide an 
explanation for the existence o f these organism s themselves. W e 
have seen th a t selection in the  form  of random  p roduction  and
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m odification and non-random  selection is proposed, as a process 
th a t can account for the  existence o f biological en tities , where 
w hat is selected is sim ply th a t which persists. But sexually repro­
ducing animals do not fit this concept: their existence simply can­
not be seen as the persistence o f som ething tha t is blindly created 
or altered. An organism finds it origin though the ingenious proc­
esses and behaviour o f reproduction o f their parents, no t through 
b lind and uncontrolled physical forces. Organism s are not merely 
entities tha t persist, m uch less does this persistence explain their 
very existence1. O rganism s m ight be subject to natural selection, 
b u t they cannot be seen as the product o f  natural selection as ran­
dom  p roduction  and non-random , directive selection. A nd this 
distinction between subject to and product o f  selection is o f pivotal 
importance: some organisms m ight be naturally selected over o th ­
ers, b u t this does take away the fact that their existence cannot be 
explained by natural selection.
2. T H E  U N IT S  O F  S E L E C T IO N  A N D  G E N IC  S E L E C T IO N IS M
T he units o f selection problem  in evolutionary biology can be 
defined as the problem  o f identifying the entities adaptations exist
1 Mayr acknowledged that not everything can be explained through random varia­
tion and non-random selection, and thus spoke about another kind of selection: “There 
is, however, also a second kind of selection, which Darwin appreciated far better than 
any of his contemporaries and which he called sexual selection. [... ] For Darwin sexual 
selection consisted of the preference of females (female choice) for particular males as 
well as in polygamous species the battles of males for the greatest possible harem. Since 
Darwin’s days it has become clear that this kind of selection includes a far wider realm 
of phenomena, and instead of sexual selection it is better referred to as ‘selection for 
reproductive success.’ It includes such phenomena as parent — offspring conflict, sib-ri- 
valry, unequal parental investment, unequal rates of division of prokaryotes, and many 
of the phenomena studied by sociobiology. In all these cases, genuine selection, not 
elimination, is involved, unlike survival selection” (Mayr [1997], p. 2091). But the el­
ementary difference between survival selection and sexual selection (or whatever we 
choose to call it) is that the former is exhaustive, and relies on nothing else but the natu­
ral forces that create and alter, while the former is again something that in itself de­
mands an explanation. Mayr placed the process of sexual reproduction to the site of the 
explanans, while sexual reproduction was exactly what we tried to explain. O ur goal was 
not to acknowledge that sexual reproduction is an elementary process in biology; our 
goal was to explain it, something which natural selection (Mayr’s survival selection), the 
only genuine and exhaustive naturalistic explanatory principle, was unable to do.
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for the good of. W e have seen tha t the traditional D arw inian ex­
planation — proposed by D arw in and still m aintained by the ma­
jority  of Darwinists (Mayr [1997]) — restricts the un it of selection 
to the organism , and thus proposes th a t adaptations exist for the 
good (fitness) o f the organism.
Dawkins proposed a fundam entally  different in terpreta tion  of 
the  u n it o f  selection. For h im , adap ta tions do n o t exist for the 
good of the organism, b u t for the good of the gene:
It is legitim ate to speak of adaptations as being ‘for the benefit o f  
som ething, bu t tha t som ething is best no t seen as the individual 
organism . It is a sm aller u n it w hich I call the active, germ -like 
replicator. T he m ost im portan t k ind o f replicator is the ‘gene’ or 
small genetic fragm ent (Dawkins [1982], p. 4).
T he gene survives because of the active phenotypic effects it exerts 
towards its own survival and replication, and it is these phenotypic 
effects th a t we see as adaptations to survival (Dawkins [1982], p. 
84).
D aw kins’ analysis o f this level and the objection to the organ­
ism as unit o f selection can be seen as an implicit attem pt to over­
come the earlier described inadequacy o f traditional Darwinism  to 
provide a complete explanation of biological phenomena. T he unit 
o f  selection is the  level adaptations exist for the  good of, which 
means, as we have seen, tha t this un it is explanans for the adapta­
tion  — the ‘for the good of the u n it’ explains the existence and fre­
quency o f traits. N ow  if the sexually reproducing organism  is the 
un it, this means th a t the sexually reproducing organism  is expla- 
nans in the explanation o f traits. However, Daw kins disqualified 
the sexually reproducing organism  as un it o f selection because it 
does no t fit his conceptual description o f w hat the un it o f selec­
tion  forem ost is: an active, germ -like replicator w ith a sufficient 
am oun t o f fecundity , copying fidelity  and longevity. B ut this is 
exactly a description o f an entity  that can be seen as the product of 
natural selection, entities that can be explained by it! Earlier I have 
focused the  analysis o f D arw in ism  on random  p ro d u c tio n  and 
non-random  selection, b u t it actually takes m ore to be a product 
o f selection, as Dawkins rightly poin ted  out. T he en tity  m ust al­
low for evolution, the gradual accum ulation o f beneficial m u ta­
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tions, thus the product o f selection m ust be a fecund replicator to 
allow the possibility o f creating sufficient copies o f itself. M oreo­
ver, these copies m ust be good, although no t too perfect to allow 
for the possibility o f m utations (copying fidelity), even though the 
replicator m ust have enough coherence and perm anence — as we 
have seen earlier — to still serve as som ething th a t persists in the 
course o f evolution. T he replicator m ust be active (have influence 
on his own survival and replication) and germ-like, which means 
that the replicator in principle can make endless copies o f itself. So 
w hat Dawkins tries to ensure is that the unit of selection can itself 
be seen as the product o f  natural selection, tha t it can be explained 
by it, because if  the un it o f selection itself cannot be explained by 
natural selection, life cannot. The unit of selection plays by defini­
tion  an im portan t role w ithin the D arw inian explanatory scheme, 
and if this un it cannot be seen as the production o f natural selec­
tion , the entire D arw inian explanation is incom plete. A nd as the 
organism  m ight be subject to selection, bu t cannot be seen as the 
product o f  selection, two things we learned to distinguish earlier, 
the  acceptance o f the organism  as u n it o f  selection explains the 
existence o f adaptations as well as the general fact o f adaptations 
through som ething tha t itself does not make sense in the light of 
natural selection2.
As indicated earlier, Daw kins’ solution to the units of selection 
problem  was the appointm ent of the gene as unit. Thus, the ques­
2 Accordingly, the nature of the controversy between those that support genic 
selectionism and those that consider the organism the unit of selection to a large extent 
relates to the different interpretation of the unit of selection: for both the unit of selec­
tion is the level adaptations exist for the good of, but while the latter consider it neces­
sary if the unit of selection is subject to selection, the former deem it additionally re­
quired that the unit is also the product of, which means that it can be explained by, 
natural selection. Thus those that support the organismic view of natural selection (such 
as Mayr and Gould) criticize genic selectionism because genes cannot be subject to selec­
tion (cannot be selected) as for example genes are not directly visible to selection, or that 
the selective value of a gene depends on the genetic background in which it operates 
(Sober [1984]). O n the other hand, Dawkins and other adherents of genic selectionism 
will stress on the fact that organisms must be disqualified as units of selection as they are 
no replicators, which implies that their existence cannot be explained by natural selec­
tion. Thus adherents of each standpoint attack the other side with arguments that are 
particular to their own interpretation of the unit of selection.
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tion  that needs to be answered is whether Dawkins’ interpretation 
o f the theory of natural selection brings us further towards a com­
plete understand ing  o f biological phenom ena. As seen, the gene 
survives because o f the active phenotypic effects it exerts towards 
its own survival and replication, and these phenotypic effects we 
in terp ret as adaptations to survival. D aw kins’ explanation at first 
sight does not contain the gaps of the traditional Darwinian expla­
nation. T he explanatory scheme seems to be self-contained, in the 
sense that it does not rely on another, unexplained element such as 
the sexually reproducing organism  in the traditional explanation. 
T here the phenotypic tra it (or adaptation) was the explanandum, 
and the organism  w ith its behaviour towards survival and repro­
duction the explanans. For Dawkins, the gene is the explanandum, 
and its phenotypic effects towards its own survival and replication 
explanans. But although Dawkins seems to have repaired the D ar­
w inian explanation by m aking it com plete and not dependent on 
another, unexplained elem ent, it still will no t satisfy us. T he rea­
son for this is twofold. First o f all, although Dawkins m ight have 
eliminated the organism out of the Darwinian explanatory scheme, 
genes still exist w ithin the reproducing organisms, and their exist­
ence fully depends on them . Theoretically, genes m ight exist ou t­
side of the organism, but actual genes do not, and can only survive 
w ith in  the context o f o ther genes w ith in  the organism. Thus, the 
elim ination o f the organism out o f the explanatory scheme is no t 
justified, as it does no t correspond to biological reality.
Secondly, organisms simply do exist, and for Darwinism to give 
an exhaustive explanation o f life, organism s have to be incorpo­
rated into this explanation. But by transferring the D arw inian ex­
p lanato ry  schem e to the  level o f the  gene, the  organism , w hich 
D aw kins defined  as vehicle, is a ha rd  th in g  to  accoun t for, as 
Dawkins him self adm itted:
G iven th a t life can be view ed as consisting  o f rep lica to rs w ith  
their extended phenotypic tools of survival, why in practise have 
replicators chosen to group themselves together by the hundreds 
o f thousands in cells, and why have they influenced those cells to 
clone themselves by the m illions o f billions in organisms? (D aw ­
kins [1982], p. 251).
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In  his w ork The Extended Phenotype, Dawkins dedicates a chapter 
to the organisms, bu t surprisingly does not show the am bition to 
provide a com plete explanation:
I have no t aspired [...] to give a com pletely satisfying answer to 
the question o f why there are large m ulticellular organisms. I will 
be c o n te n t if  I can arouse new  cu rio u s ity  ab o u t the  q u es tio n  
(Dawkins [1982], p. 263).
W hat Dawkins provides is a discussion of how imaginable alterna­
tive life forms would be less stable or w ould provide fewer oppor­
tunities for evolution, bu t this is no t an explanation and does not 
provide the raison d ’être o f individual organisms in light o f their 
benefits for replicators.
T he value o f a theory can be seriously questioned when it can­
not even provide an account for the m ost salient and fundam ental 
un it of life. But (like with Darwin) this is precisely w hat happens 
in the case o f D aw kins’ theory: w hen confron ted  w ith  the m ost 
intricate, complex and astonishing phenom enon in the biosphere, 
the biological en tity  per excellence — the organism  — Daw kins re­
m ains silent. T he concept o f genic selectionism  — like the trad i­
tional D arw in ian  theo ry  — is unable to  provide an account for 
sexually reproducing organisms, their origin as well as their proc­
esses and behaviour. T h is  m eans th a t w ith  D aw kins we rem ain 
where D arw in left us, nam ely at the question for the ground for 
the existence o f organisms w ith their behaviour tow ards survival 
and reproduction: Darwin assumed it, Dawkins tried to ignore it, 
b u t neither of them  explained it.
3. G R O U P  O R  SPECIES?
T he theory  o f natural selection th a t considers adaptations for 
the good o f groups or species has greatly lost popularity  after the 
criticism  it received from  prom inen t biologists such as W illiam s 
[1966] and  D aw kins [1976]. These objections include the  fact 
tha t groups or species do not sufficiently exist in the form  of cop­
ies (thus do no t allow for the gradual accum ulation o f beneficial 
m utations), and the high chance tha t selfish organisms w ould in­
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fect and underm ine the groups or species. T he consensus among 
contem porary biologists is that group selection can at most be seen 
as a weak force in evolution as the conditions for it to  occur are 
quite stringent (H ull and Ruse [1998]).
T he goal o f this paper is no t to focus on these aspects of group 
or species selection, bu t to see to w hat extent this D arw inian ex­
p lana to ry  schem e, given th a t it w ould  exist and  the  objections 
against it w ould  proven to be false, w ould  be able to  provide an 
exhaustive account o f biological phenom ena.
If the group or species is the un it of selection, adaptations exist 
for the good o f this level. N ow  adaptations are about the lowest 
level in the hierarchy o f life, while groups or species comprise the 
highest. An elem entary level between these two is again form ed by 
the individual organism that ensures the preservation of this group 
or species. Individual organisms are indispensable in the m aintain­
ing o f the  group or species, b u t the  two ends o f the  theory , the 
adaptations w ith  its explanatory g round, the  preservation o f the 
group or species, are in no way able to provide a possibility to ex­
plain the existence o f individual organisms, while their existence 
and preservation are fully dependent on it. Thus, in case o f group 
or species selection we can be very short, as this in terpreta tion  of 
the  theory  o f natural selection in no way provides a tool for ex­
plaining the existence o f reproducing organisms.
4. C O N S E Q U E N C E S  O F  T H E  IN A B IL IT Y  O F  D A R W IN IS M  
T O  A C C O U N T  F O R  T H E  SEXUALLY R E P R O D U C IN G  O R G A N IS M
T he theory o f natural selection gives a m echanism  how organ­
isms have evolved to the way they are, how the possibility o f ran­
dom  varia tion  allows for na tu ra l selection to  w ork as a sieve to 
preserve certain changes. N atural selection, however, does no t di­
rectly deal w ith the workings o f living beings themselves, how they 
grow, physiologically function , reproduce, etc. T he  theory  p ro ­
poses a m echanism  o f how  organism s have become the way they 
are, bu t its sphere does not encompass the biological processes of 
living beings when they are the way they are. M ayr [1988] in tro ­
duced the  d istinction  betw een proxim ate and u ltim ate  explana-
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tions to  describe the difference betw een causal explanations and 
explanations by natural selection. Proximate causes relate to physico­
chemical explanations. U ltim ate causes, on the o ther hand, relate 
to historical causes for the existing adaptations and particular ad­
ap ta tio n s  o f organism s. In  his p aper Chasing Shadows, W alsh  
[2000] claims the two are in fact related: for an insight in the causes 
o f adaptive change, one has to abandon the statistical dynamical 
model o f evolution, and forem ost has to understand the nature of 
organisms. T he  m ain question th a t lies at the core o f the under­
standing o f adaptive complexity is w hat k ind o f things organisms 
are, such th a t selection of, and m utation  w ith in  them  eventuates 
in adaptive evolution. N atural selection exists by virtue of the fact 
th a t the  individual organism s it operates over are complex, self­
organizing systems, the understanding o f which thus forms a cru­
cial factor in the understanding of evolution.
T hus, a com plete explanation o f life consists o f two separate 
albeit in terrelated  elem ents: the explanation o f changes through  
the  process o f natu ral selection, and  the ‘causal’ explanation  of 
biological entities themselves through a systematic understanding 
o f living beings as complex systems, founded on the laws o f phys­
ics and chemistry.
T he  causal explanation o f life concerns a m yriad o f processes 
and phenom ena o f a b reath tak ing  com plexity. Living beings, as 
often  claim ed, are by far the  m ost com plex systems in the  u n i­
verse, and it can be doubted that it will ever be explained in all its 
detail. However, there are some fundam ental concepts w ithin the 
study o f life, elem entary principles founded on naturalistic, physi­
cal principles tha t are o f key im portance in the understanding of 
living beings. These include the extensively dealt w ith notions of 
the genetic program , the process o f replication, and concepts de­
rived from  system science such as causal feedback loops and self­
organization.
T he process o f replication, one of those essential notions, does 
not only play a fundam ental role w ithin the causal functioning of 
living beings, but also in the evolutionary theory of genic selection- 
ism. As we have seen, replicators tha t make copies o f themselves 
w ith a sufficient degree o f longevity-fecundity-copying fidelity cre­
ate the possibility of evolution, leading to the development in time
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of complex and varied replicators. In  light o f the m entioned  two 
aspects o f the explanation o f life, it is im portan t to stress that the 
workings o f the replicators themselves are not explained by natural 
selection. The evolution o f replicators and how they are shaped the 
way they are can be explained by natural selection, b u t the expla­
nation o f the mechanisms of their workings, on the other hand, is 
the realm o f the causal explanation o f how replicators survive and 
replicate. N atu ra l selection explains why replicators are the way 
they are, by providing a mechanism for their origin, bu t it assumes 
tha t replicators do replicate, and does not provide an explanation 
how this process o f replication works. This causal explanation has 
been the subject o f elaborate scientific and philosophical analysis 
over the past decades.
B ut the process o f replication is n o t the only process th a t de­
mands such a causal explanation. M any organisms reproduce sexu­
ally. T he sexually reproducing species can be seen as a device that 
perm utes a discrete set o f m utually accustomed genes in different 
com bination, continuously  shuffling com binations o f genes tha t 
m eet each o ther w ith in  the  species (D aw kins [1986]). A nd this 
continuous flow of com binations, from  the one unique constella­
t io n  o f genes to  th e  o th e r, shou ld  also be p u re ly  causally  ex­
plained, as this sexual reproduction is no t the realm o f natural se­
lection since it does not concern the change in biological entities 
th rough random  m utations and subsequent selection. Organism s 
m ight be subject to selection, bu t cannot be seen as the product of 
natural selection, as we have seen before. T he process o f reproduc­
tion  is a process o f change, bu t it is no t the process o f change that 
relates to random  variation and subsequent selection: physiological 
processes are responsible for sexual reproduction, not m utations or 
o ther sorts of random  alterations. Thus, natural selection assumes 
the workings o f replicators and leaves this explanation untouched, 
and likewise neither accounts for the process o f sexual reproduc­
tion.
It is im portant to mark the fundam ental difference between the 
process o f replication and reproduction. T he replicator has been 
defined as an en tity  tha t passes on its structure (largely in tact, to 
allow for variation on which natural selection can do its work) in
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successive replications (Nanay [2002]). T he process of replication 
is the  repeated rep roduction  o f the  same structure: the  specific 
structure contained in the replicator is copied to external material, 
w hich in its tu rn  im poses its struc tu re  on again o ther m aterial. 
N atu ra l selection provides a m echanism  o f how  the structure  of 
the replicator is shaped, b u t the laws of physics and chemistry ex­
plain the fact th a t this structure is tim e and tim e again im posed 
on d ifferen t m ateria l th ro u g h  the  process o f rep lica tion . T hus 
natu ral selection deals w ith the selection o f d ifferent form s, no t 
w ith  m atter itse lf3. A specific form  or constellation is naturally  
selected, and physico-chemical processes lead to the process o f rep­
lication , in  w hich d ifferen t m atte r is shaped in  the form  o f the 
replicator. M oreover, it is very well conceivable tha t this replica­
tion can go on ad in fin itum : the structure contained in the first re­
plicator is identical to and causally determ ines the structure o f a 
fu ture replicator, w hether it is 1, 10, or 1 m illion generation fur­
ther.
Furtherm ore, the process o f replication can in essence be u n ­
derstood causally in chemical terms. T he fundam ental feature un­
derlying the possibility of replication is constituted by the existence 
o f  chemical affinities between molecules. In  princip le, the  core o f 
replication is the existence o f the affinity o f D N A  m olecule A d­
enine for m olecule T hym ine (and vice versa), and the affinity o f 
m olecule G uan ine  for m olecule C ytosine. It is this affinity  th a t 
essentially  underlies rep lica tion , and  th is p h enom enon  should  
therefore be explained by it, as well as the unlim ited  potential of 
this process.
However, the process o f sexual reproduction  is fundam entally  
different: a reproducer is no t copying an existing structure shaped 
by natural selection, bu t creating a new structure or constellation, 
the form er nor the la tte r directly being form ed by natural selec­
tion. T hus reproducers cause the creation o f new reproducers with
3 This notion is too little highlighted in Darwinistic literature. In living beings, 
matter changes in a constant flux, and the element constant in life is always the form, 
but never its matter. Consequently, natural selection always refers to the selection of 
certain forms, never to the matter within this form itself. Thus when we conclude that 
the replicator can be seen as a product of natural selection, it always refers to the specific 
form of the replicator, not to its material content.
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a different structure, which is som ething fundam entally  different 
and scientifically more challenging to account for than the replica­
tion  o f the same structure. W here in the case of replicators a form 
is retained and m atter is changing, in the case o f reproducers nei­
ther the form  nor the m atter are retained, the only th ing  th a t is 
perm anent — and natural selection can give an account for — is the 
bu ild ing  blocks o f the genetic m aterial, genes. M oreover, while 
replication only needs the existence o f one replicator for the proc­
ess to take place, reproduction requires the existence of a group of 
m utually  co-adapted reproducers, the  existence o f w hich, there­
fore, causally also needs to be accounted for. Szathmary and M ay­
nard  Sm ith  [1997] in troduced  the  term  reproducer next to  the 
replicator, and so also suggesting a sim ilar role for sexual repro­
duction  w ith in  the theory o f natural selection as replication. D e­
spite this, its explanation has not received the level o f attention as 
the replicator has.
A challenge within such an explanation will be illustrated through 
the  ideas o f Jacques M o nod  set fo rth  in  his classic Chance and  
Necessity [1972]. In  this work, M onod describes the m ost salient 
characteristics of living beings: the fact that they are self-construct­
ing m achines (they owe no th ing  to  the action o f outside forces, 
b u t everything from  in teractions w ith in  the  object itself), their 
teleonom ic characteristics (organism s are objects th a t are seem­
ingly endowed w ith a purpose or project), and their ability to re­
produce and to transm it unaltered the inform ation corresponding 
to  th e ir own structu re , or self-reproduction. M oreover, M onod  
claims that the fact that these characteristics — especially teleonom y 
and reproductive invariance — are interconnected, solves the epis- 
temological paradox connected to living beings, their ‘strangeness’ 
in  ligh t o f the  na tu ra lis tic  prem ises o f m odern  science, nam ely 
their teleonom ic character. Invariant reproduction is the ability of 
living beings to reproduce and to transm it unaltered the inform a­
tion  corresponding to their own structure. T he inform ation  tha t 
stands at the  basis o f all teleological processes and behaviour by 
serving as a b luep rin t for the organizational scheme o f the in d i­
vidual, is preserved intact from  one generation to the next one (see 
also Van Rossum [2003]). M oreover, M onod claims that the con­
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nection between teleonom y and invariant or self-reproduction is 
the only way in which living beings can be brought into a natural­
istic understanding.
But associating teleonom y with self-reproduction — causing the 
fact that “source o f the inform ation expressed in the structure of a 
living being is always (italics from  author) another, structurally  
identical object” (M onod [1972], p. 12) — is m aking sense of cer­
ta in  biological phenom ena  (rep lica tion), b u t neglecting  others 
(sexual reproduction). It should be clear tha t in sexual reproduc­
tion, the source o f the inform ation expressed in the structure o f a 
living being is never another, structurally identical object. Explain­
ing self-reproduction (replication) is a comfortable undertaking for 
a naturalist — as we have seen, its essence can be understood through 
the existence o f chemical affinities. But explaining sexual repro­
duction  is o f an entire different nature, and rem ains, also in case 
o f M onod, unexplored.
If  we stay in line w ith M o n o d ’s term inology, it is our task to 
connect teleonom y (seemingly goal directed processes) with repro­
ductive  variance, and  it is exactly  here w here a d ifficu lty  lies. 
Sexual reproduction, as seen over the generations, is continuously 
creating new  com binations o f genes, ever again shuffling genetic 
material into unique constellations. M oreover, these constellations 
are teleonomically (vs. randomly) created, as sexual reproduction is 
(most clearly in higher animals) aim ed at specific entities. M ating 
partners are not random ly chosen, bu t the process of sexual repro­
duction is targeted at specific entities w ith certain characteristics.
Sexual reproduction as this dynamic, teleonom ic process is dif­
ficult to understand  since it cannot be just chem ically explained 
like replicators, b u t dem ands a cybernetic account. I f  we take a 
group o f organism s in a certain  p o in t o f tim e, these organism s 
carry w ith in  them , through  their structure and genetic constitu ­
tio n , the  p o ten tia l for creating  endlessly  new  organism s, each 
unique in their genetic make-up. It is therefore the task o f science, 
and cybernetics in particular, to give an account for this possibility
— the science o f systems constantly creating new systems, systems 
w ith this autonom ous, creative, and teleonom ic potential. It is in 
that light tha t sexually reproducing organisms have to be seen and 
explained, as it form s an essential ing red ien t in the naturalistic
understanding o f living beings.
Pointing out the problem atic position o f sex w ithin the theory 
o f natural selection is, o f course, far from  original. T he question 
why sex exists, its raison d ’être in light o f the theory o f natural se­
lection, has inspired a still ongoing discussion w ith in  biology, as 
was also seen in the remarks Dawkins made in The Extended Phe­
notype. But this paper attem pts to  do m ore. Besides to the ques­
tion  o f why sex exists (for a fundam ental aspect of life certainly a 
justifiable query), comes the question on how  it works. By strip­
ping the theory o f natural selection to its essence — the explanation 
o f the gradual accum ulation o f features by the iterative process of 
random  production  and variation, and subsequent non-random , 
directive selection — it becomes clear tha t this explanatory fram e­
work is not fit to explain sexual reproduction. T he immediate con­
sequence o f th a t observation is th a t a proxim ate, causal explana­
tion  o f the phenom enon should be given instead.
N ow  also here one can argue that the proxim ate explanation of 
sex has received a lot o f a ttention w ithin biological literature. But 
although the extensively dealt w ith behavioural and physiological 
aspects o f sexual behaviour concern a causal, proxim ate explana­
tion  o f sex, it does no t cover the explanation as identified in this 
paper. O ne m ight understand  the physiology o f fertilization, or 
understand the courting behaviour of ducks, b u t this does not ex­
plain how systems — living beings — carry w ith in  them  the poten­
tial of infinitely creating new, specific and unique systems (organ­
isms) through sexual reproduction. Again, what is needed is a com­
plex theory o f  sex, how we can understand the principles o f organ­
isms as reproducing systems, or the dynamical and creative poten­
tial o f living beings to continuously  and au tonom ously  produce 
new and specific organisms with unique constellations. In order to 
abandon the statistical dynamics point o f view to get a full under­
standing o f life as W alsh [2000] encourages us to do, one does not 
have to consider the individual organism, b u t organisms as com ­
plex systems th a t infinitely produce new organisms, each w ith its 
own unique constitution. By clearly m arking the boundaries of the 
theory o f natural selection (what this paper attem pted to do), we 
see th a t the  u n it w ith in  life th a t requires a causal explanation is 
n o t the isolated organism , b u t a comm unity o f  organisms tied  to­
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gether in space and time through sexual reproduction. O nce m oulded 
by natural selection, this group of organisms is endlessly producing 
new organisms, shuffling the genetic content o f the species in ever 
new constellations. By scrutinizing the theory of natural selection 
and clearly analysing its nature and the lim its o f its explanatory 
po ten tia l, sexual reproduction  is found  insufficiently  explained, 
revealed as a gap w ithin the naturalistic understanding o f life. In ­
stead of being assumed or ignored, this fundam ental characteristic 
o f living beings needs to be accounted for w ith in  the naturalistic 
paradigm  o f science in a causal, cybernetic way.
5. C O N C L U S IO N
Living beings have long posed a problem  for naturalistic, m ate­
rialistic philosophers who attem pted to explain the world through 
physical, m echanistic laws. Rejecting all finalistic, dualistic and 
vitalistic explanations on natural phenom ena, naturalism  is still 
left w ith  the question how  the w orld ends up filled w ith objects 
th a t seem to falsify the claim th a t everything in the w orld is the 
result o f the free play of physical forces to which no goal, purpose 
or specific d irec tion  can be a ttr ib u ted . T h e  ideas laid  dow n in 
D arw in ’s O rig in  o f Species are considered to  be the  key to  the 
m ystery, the  rem edy from  all v ita listic , dualis tic  and  finalistic  
claims of the natural world as they provide a framework to explain 
the  existence o f biological phenom ena in a na tu ra listic  contex t 
(M ontalenti [1974]).
I have a ttem p ted  to  show lim ita tions  o f D arw in ’s theo ry  o f 
natural selection in relation to sexual reproduction. Sexual repro­
duction, defined as the dynamical and creative potential o f living 
beings to continuously and autonom ously produce new organisms 
w ith unique and specific constellations, has been assumed by the 
traditional in terp reta tion  o f natural selection, and rem oved from  
the  elem entary explanatory  schem e of the theory  o f genic selec- 
tionism . I have also shown that sexual reproduction couldn’t pos­
sibly be explained by natural selection, whose creative po ten tia l 
consists o f the iterative process o f non-random  selection on ran­
dom  production and variation. T his brings another dim ension to
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the  science o f sex: next to the  explanation o f w hy sex exists (its 
raison d ’être in light o f sexual reproduction), a close and detailed 
exam ination on the natu re  o f the theory  o f sexual reproduction  
reveals the need for a mechanistic, cybernetic explanation of sexual 
reproduction as well. For a complete naturalistic account o f living 
beings, science should give an account for the dynamical and crea­
tive potential o f living beings to continuously and autonom ously 
produce new organisms w ith unique constellations. This conclu­
sion brings sexual reproduction  into new light: as a fundam ental 
and  — th ro u g h  the  essential te leonom ic , dynam ic and  creative 
characteristic o f sexual reproduction — challenging gap in the un­
derstanding o f life in a naturalistic explanatory framework.
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SULLA IN ID O N E IT À  D ELLA  S E L E Z IO N E  N A T U R A LE  
A SPIEG A R E LA R IP R O D U Z IO N E  SESSUALE,
E LE D IF F IC O L T À  C H E  R IM A N G O N O
Riassunto
Essenzialmente, il potere esplicativo della teoria della selezione n a tu ­
rale fa riferim ento ad un processo iterativo di produzione casuale e suc­
cessiva selezione non-casuale. Viene qui m ostrato come in questa cornice 
esplicativa non ci sia spazio per la riproduzione sessuale. In effetti, nella 
letteratura darwinista, la riproduzione sessuale — una della caratteristiche 
p iù  salienti della natura  — è spesso assunta o ignorata, ma non spiegata. 
Per arrivare ad una com pleta com prensione naturalistica degli esseri vi­
venti è necessario che la biologia riesca a dar conto del potenziale d ina­
mico e creativo della riproduzione sessuale.
